The Limitations Act, 1972 is the statute in Ghana that regulates time limits for commencing certain legal actions. The law of limitation is not unique to our jurisdiction as it has been developed in other jurisdictions from which we have acquired our legal traditions. In Burkett v James, Lord Edmund Davies reiterated the reasons for statutory provisions imposing periods of limitation. He said:
“…Secondly, the law of limitation is designed to encourage plaintiffs to institute proceedings as soon as it is reasonably possible for them to do so …. Thirdly, the law is intended to ensure that a person may with confidence feel that after a given period he may regard as finally closed an incident which might have led to a claim against him; and it was for this reason that Lord Kenyon described statutes of limitation as statutes of repose”.
The purpose of our Act was stated concisely in the case of Amoa and Another v Abeka as follows:
“The object of the Limitation Act was to limit the periods within which legal proceedings could commence and being a time limiting factor, it had to have a certain or ascertainable starting point”
There are other statutes that prescribe specific time limitations for bringing actions, such as actions against a statutory body.
NRCD 54 stipulates time limits within which causes of action must be litigated, failing which an action on the specific cause of action is barred. Actions brought after two years to claim damages for slander or seduction; to recover a contribution against one or more concurrent wrongdoers; or a penalty or forfeiture, or sum by way of penalty or forfeiture recoverable under any enactment, are barred1.
Actions in tort to claim damages for personal injuries are barred after three years2, whereas actions in other torts (simple contract, enforcing a recognisance or an arbitral award and actions to recover money) are barred after six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued3.
Actions on an instrument under seal to recover money due from a member of a registered company, to recover arrears of income tax and customs duty, to enforce judgments, claims in respect of the movable estate of a deceased person and actions to recover land are barred after 12 years4.
Actions to recover a principal sums of money secured by a mortgage5 as well as mortgaged land6 are barred after 12 years. However actions to recover arrears of interest accruing on the principal money secured by a mortgage shall not be brought after the expiration of six years after the interest became due.
As a general rule, these periods of limitations may be extended by the court only on grounds of disability7, acknowledgement8, part payment9, fraud10 or mistake11.
From the foregoing, where a person is under disability and a period of limitation is fixed for a cause of action which has accrued, the computation of the limitation period will exclude the period of the disability.
The Act also provides for various instances under section 17 where the computation of a limitation period for a cause of action will accrue on and not before acknowledgement in writing of the material facts that underpin the cause of action.
The courts have opined that acknowledgment of a debt for instance must be clear and demand notices alone without more will not suffice to ground a claim of acknowledgement. In the case of AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK V ANTHONY ANNAN, the court discussing the issue of acknowledgement provided as follows;
The law does not provide a prescribed form in which the acknowledgement must be made, it simply states that it must be in writing. The unregulated form of an acknowledgement as required under section 17 of NRCD 54 was acknowledged in the unreported High Court case of First Atlantic Bank Ltd. v Sefos & Sons Ltd and Anor (suit no. BFS 201/2014 delivered on 20th June, 2019, by his Lordship Richmond Osei Hwere, J.) which I find persuasive. Learned Judge opined as follows:
“Section 13(1) of the Statute of Limitation Act (NRCD 54) provides as follows: “No action shall be brought to recover any principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or charge on property, whether movable or immovable after the expiration of twelve (12) years from the date when the right to receive the money accrued”.
Subsection 3 of the section 13 further provides:
“No action shall be brought to recover arrears of interest payable in respect of any sum of money secured by a mortgage or charge on movable or immovable property or to recover damages in respect of such arrears, after the expiration of six (6) years from the date on which the interest became due.” From section 13 of NRCD 54 it is easy to conclude that the current action is out of time since the loan facility was a short-term loan which was due in 2005. However, the right of the Plaintiff to institute the present action is revived by the exceptions provided in NRCD 54 such as acknowledgement or part payment of the debt. Section 17(1)(a) of NRCD 54 provides:
“In the following cases the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of acknowledgement: (a) where any right of action has accrued to recover any debt and the person liable therefore has acknowledged the debt.”
The Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edition, 2004) defines acknowledgement of debt as:
“A recognition by a debtor of the existence of a debt”.
The profound question is: What amounts to an acknowledgement of a debt? In Chitty on Contracts, 31st edition volume 1 page 2000, the author commented on the form an acknowledgement must take when it was stated as follows: “The acknowledgement must be in writing and signed by the person making it…As to the requirement of writing, the following (inter alia) will qualify: correspondence, an account rendered, a recital in a deed, a company’s balance sheet, an affidavit and a pleading”
From the foregoing my considered view is that in the absence of a prescribed form, any document from which an acknowledgment of a debt can be inferred to all intent and purposes must be deemed to constitute an acknowledgement of the debt.
The court further looked at the legal efficacy of demand notices to ground claims of acknowledgement.
“My view on the legal effect of these demand notices on limitation of actions is that NRCD 54 does not provide for such scenarios. Thus unless these demand notices are acknowledged, I am of the view that sending demand notices does not stop the limitation period from running”.
The court supported the above position with the dictum in Fiaga vs. Ghana Cocoa Board which discussed the acknowledgement with regard to negotiations as follows
“Where parties embarked on negotiations and eventually agreed on the issue of liability, a defendant, when sued out of time, could not plead a statute of limitation as a bar to the action. Where, however, there had not been an agreement, as in the present case; where no evidence to the effect that the defendants had accepted liability was tendered, the plaintiff could not be heard to say that he was negotiating with the defendant and accordingly should be allowed to commence his action outside the limitation period”.
Finally, the courts will also generally extend the period of limitation where a party makes part payment of a debt or fraud at the instance of the defendant in a transaction or mistake is established.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing makes it clear that a plaintiff whose cause of action has accrued is bound by statute to remain vigilant and conscious of the time. The law on the limitations is quite clear and subject to a few exceptions, a party who is indolent will be left with no venue to hear his grievance or receive a remedy.
1 Section 2 of NRCD 54
2 Section 3 of NRCD 54
3 Section 4 of NRCD 54
4 Section 5 of NRCD 54
5 Section 13 of NRCD 54
6 Section 12 of NRCD 54
7 Section 16 of NRCD 54
8 Section 17 of NRCD 54
9 Section 19 of NRCD 54
10 Section 22 of NRCD 54
11 ibid
